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One of the principal arguments in favor of abortion is that it is not 
wrong because what is killed in abortion is not a person, and killing 
nonpersons can be morally permissible. And the claim that what is killed in 
abortion is not a person is defended by two types of arguments. One type is 
basically a simple appeal to intuition. "How can a tiny being only a half 
inch long have the same rights as a grown woman, isn't that incredible?" 
The answer to such appeals to so-called intuition is to point out that 
prejUdice may very well be mistaken for intuition. We have no reason to 
believe that size and appearance are morally relevant properties, and to 
discriminate between beings on the basis of non-morally relevant 
properties is undue discrimination. 
The second type of argument is more than an appeal to intuition or 
prejUdice. The structure of this type of argument is, first to argue that one 
must have some property or set of properties in order to be a person, and , 
then , to argue that human fetuses do not have that property or set of 
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properties. More formally: 
One is a person only if one has property F. 
Human fetuses do not have property F. 
Therefore, human fetuses are not persons. 
Various candidates are put forward for property F. In this article I 
consider what has recently become a popular position, namely, the 
position that sentience is the criterion of moral standing, but that there are 
degrees of moral standing in such a way that early abortions are 
permissible but late abortions are usually not. I will argue that this position 
is incorrect, and I will set out positive reasons to show that the human 
embryo or fetus, from conception onwards, does have complete moral 
standing and does have a right to life. First I would like to examine mOre 
closely the general requirements for a criterion of personhood. 
What is sometimes put forward as the standard argument in favor of the 
position that human fetuses are persons in an argument based on the 
similarity between successive stages in the development of the fetus in the 
womb. Roger Wertheimer, in his 1971 article, "Understanding the 
Abortion Argument", is frequently quoted . Summing up the so-called 
conservative position, i.e., the position that human fetuses are persons and 
therefore abortion is immoral, Wertheimer writes: 
But I am inclined to suppose that the conservative is right, that going back stage 
by stage from the infant to the zygote one will not find any differences between 
successive stages significant enough to bear the enormous moral burden of 
allowing wholesale slaughter at the earlier stage while categorically denying that 
permission at the next stage.! 
As a species of slippery slope argument , this argument has its difficulties . 
Opponents of the pro-life position have pointed out that the fact the 
differences between successive stages in the development of a being are not 
significant does not show that there are no significant changes at all , that 
there are none between non-successive stages in the development of that 
being. Thus, Donald VanDeVeer writes: 
More concretely, what impresses many persons who are neither abortionists nor 
uncomfortably pregnant is that there are substantial differences between the early 
fetal stages ... and the neonate . Early on, the embryo is quite indeterminately 
formed , comparatively speaking; in the early fetal stages there is no heart or brain 
function and no movement of limbs. The empirical differences between what we 
may loosely designate as S2 or S3 < stage 2 or stage 3> and the neonate are 
striking.2 
Analogies clarify the point VanDe Veer is making. The difference between 
sanity and insanity is significant, and yet a person can gradually become 
insane in such a way that the differences between any two successive 
changes in that person's transformation will be slight, while the differences 
between non-successive stages are significant. 
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Issue is Sharpened 
This point, however, only sharpens the issue. Granted, there are 
differences - even significant differences - between the zygote and the 
newborn. Are those differences morally relevant? That is, are they 
significant in the way the pro-abortionist needs them to be? That is, are 
these differences sufficient to ground the differential treatment acorded to 
newborn babies on the one hand, and embryos or fetuses on the other 
hand? When we compare an embryo in very early stages of development 
with a newborn infant, the differences are marked; yet, there are also 
important similarities. VanDe Veer focuses on the significant differences, 
but one could also focus on significant similarities, such as being of the 
same species , having the same genetic structure, having human parents, 
and so on. The real question is: what differences and what similarities are 
morally relevant? We need an argument which distinguishes morally 
relevant differences and similarities from morally irrelevant differences 
and similarities. 
Moreover, this argument to distinguish the morally relevant from the 
morally irrelevant cannot be based simply on an appeal to ordinary 
language or linguistic conventions. That is, one cannot argue that fetuses 
have no rights because they are not "persons", ifby that one means merely 
that they lack characteristics which, according to the conventions of Qur 
language, a thing must have in order to be called a person. 3 For, whatever 
the linguistic conventions of our culture are - although I think, as a 
matter offact, according to those linguistic conventions fetuses do qualify 
as "persons" - one could always doubt whether those conventions are 
morally correct. And so, whichever way one argues, ordinary language or 
the linguistic conventions of our culture cannot by themselves settle the 
issue. 
One position, which seems to have gained some popularity lately in 
philosophical circles, is presented as a moderate position, taking the 
golden mean as it were between the so-called extremes of the conservative 
and the liberal positions. L. W. Sumner speaks of it as the "third way" in 
his book, Abortion and Moral Theory .4 Other representatives are S. I. 
Benn5 and Norman Gillespie.6 According to Sumner, what counts as a 
benefit or a harm for a person is either the fact that its desires are satisfied 
or frustrated, or the fact that it is brought to experience what it likes or 
what it dislikes . From this premise, Sumner concludes that benefits and 
harms for particular persons must be interpreted in terms of psychological 
states , and that morality, which concerns harms and benefits, "can concern 
itself only with beings who are conscious or sentient."7 For Sumner, then, 
sentience is the criterion of moral standing. All sentient beings, i.e. , all 
animals, have morlU standing. By a criterion of "moral standing", he 
means a criterion by which one determines whether a being has a right to 
life or not, although the strength of that right to life (according to Sumner) 
may vary. 
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According to Sumner there are degrees of moral standing, corresponding 
to the degrees of sentience among various animals. "The animal kingdom 
presents us with a hierarchy of sentience. Nonsentient beings have no 
moral standing; among sentient beings the more developed have greater 
standing than the less developed, the upper limit being occupied by the 
paradigm of a normal adult human being."8 Again, "As the duties may 
vary in strength, so may the corresponding rights . To have some moral 
standing is to have some right to life, whether or not it may be overridden 
by the rights of others. To have full moral standing is to have the strongest 
right to life possessed by anyone, the right to life of a paradigm person."9 
According to Sumner it is a great merit of this theory that "it seems to 
accord reasonably well with most people's intuitions that in our moral 
reasoning paramecia and horseflies count for nothing, dogs and cats count 
for something, chimpanzees and dolphins count for more, and human 
beings count for most of all." 10 
Sumner's Conclusion 
With this criterion, Sumner concludes that the fetus has no moral 
standing at all in the first trimester of gestation, since in that period he or 
she is presentient; that this organism begins to acquire moral standing in 
the second trimester; and that the moral standing of the fetus in the third 
trimester is roughly equal to the moral standing of the newborn infant. He 
thus holds that abortion in the early stages of pregnancy is no different 
than contraception, while abortion in the later stages of pregnancy may 
have a moral quality approaching that of infanticide. Sumner favorably 
describes this view of the status of the fetus as "gradual, differential, and 
developmental."l0 He believes this approach accords much better with our 
so-called commonsense intuitions. 
The rhetorical appeal of this approach should not be underestimated. 
Any position which can be presented as taking a virtuous mean, especially 
on an issue about which highly emotional confrontations occur, has 
tremendous appeal. People naturally fear outright confrontation and so a 
moderate position, which allows one to say that one partly agrees with 
each side without, of course, their alleged peculiar exaggerations, has an 
emotional appeal beyond whatever intellectual appeal it may have. 
The first point to inquire about is the basis for the position that sentience 
is what confers inherent value on a thing. There can be little doubt that, at 
least in some sense, it is the same organism which exists in the very early 
stages of gestation, when the organism can be killed according to Sumner, 
and in the later stages of gestation after birth, when because of the 
organism's sentience, the organism ought not to be killed according to 
Sumner. That is, according to Sumner, with respect to the same organism, 
it is morally permissible to kill that organism at a certain time, but not 
morally right to kill this organism at a later time. Clearly, then, on this view 
it is not the organism itself which has inherent value, even during those 
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times when it is not permissible to kill it. That is, the reason why one ought 
not to kill the third trimester fetus and infants is not that the organism itself 
has inherent value, but because his or her life is a necessary means for 
realizing what does have inherent value. Thus, implicit in this view is the 
position that life does not really have inherent value - that inherent value 
is found in something else. 
Thus, when Sumner argues that sentience is what confers moral 
standing on a being, the position he takes , in effect, is that sentience, in its 
various degrees, counting rationality as a type of developed sentience, is 
the inherent value, in effect, the only inherent value. 
As far as I can see, the only bases for this position are either hedonism or 
dualism. Sumner himself explicitly appeals to a type of hedonism. He 
argues that, properly speaking, benefits consist in the satisfaction of 
conscious desires or the experience of what one likes. One also could hold 
his position, or at least a position very close to it, on the basis of dualism. 
Michael Tooley, for example, in his book Abortion and Infanticide, 
argues in this manner. 12 The first step, then , in replying to the gradualist 
position is to provide arguments, albeit brief, against hedonism and 
dualism. The results of these arguments, however, will be more than 
negative. 
Refuting Hedonism 
First, hedonism. Hedonism is the view that, not only are all inherent 
goods pleasures and inherent bads pains , but what makes good things 
inherently good is pleasure and what makes inherently bad things bad is 
pain, that pleasure is the formality of good. Thus to refute hedonism one 
need only show that there is a good that is not a pleasure . From that it will 
follow that pleasure is not the formality of good. When we say that 
something is good, we are saying that it is desirable , so if we can show that 
there is a desirable which is not a pleasure and so not desired only because 
it is a pleasure, then we will have shown that a good exists which is not a 
pleasure or a means to a pleasure. 
There are two types of pleasure. Some pleasures are simply sensations of 
a certain type . Thus, someone can take a drug simply for the sake of the 
sensation he gets from it. Another type of pleasure consists in the 
satisfaction of a desire. Thus, solving a mathematical problem produces 
pleasure, not as a type of sensation, but as a fulfillment of the desire for the 
solution. Thus , I can work a mathematical problem for the sake of the 
pleasure, the pleasure being the delight which comes with the solution. By 
extension, the hedonist will say that I desire knowledge, not for its own 
sake, but for the sake of the pleasure or joy which knowledge produces in 
me. 
Now, to refute hedonism, all one needs to show is that there is an object 
which is desired which is not a pleasure in either of these senses , and it is 
not means to a pleasure in either of these senses. It will then follow that 
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something is desirable which is not a pleasure or a means to pleasure, and 
therefore that pleasure is not what makes good things good (what makes 
desirable things desirable). 
The example of the desire to solve a mathematical problem is, I think, 
sufficient for our purposes. Clearly, this desire is not a desire for the sake of 
a pleasure as a certain type of sensation. The hedonist, then, will have to 
say that it is a desire for the pleasure or delight that consists in the 
satisfaction of the desire. In many cases, the hedonist analysis of this desire 
is partially correct; that is, in many cases we desire knowledge simply for 
the sake of the satisfaction which comes from satisfying our desire. But the 
problem is that this second-order desire, the desire to satisfy a desire, must 
be parasitic on some first-order desire. And in the example we are 
considering, the first-order desire cannot consist in a desire for a pleasure 
in either of the senses explained above, since this first-order desire cannot 
be for a particular type of sensation nor be itself a desire for the satisfaction 
of still another desire. 
Therefore, while the desire for knowledge can in some cases be the desire 
for the pleasure which consists in the satisfaction of a desire, not every 
desire for knowledge can be that. And so some instances of a desire for 
knowledge are desires for knowledge for its own sake, desires for 
knowledge for the sake of knowledge. Hence there is something desired 
which is neither a pleasure nor a means to a pleasure. Therefore there is a 
desirable object which is not a pleasure nor a means to a pleasure. 
Therefore not every good is a pleasure or a means to a pleasure. Therefore 
pleasure is not what makes good things good; pleasure is not the formality 
of good. 
Analyzing Desire for Knowledge 
If we analyze the example of desire for knowledge for its own sake, I 
think we will find it most plausible that we desire things simply because 
they are fulfilling, because they are perfective or build us up . Of course, we 
desire fulfillment not only for ourselves but for others as well- this is not 
an egoistic principle. In any case, fulfillment, or perfection is what makes 
good things good, i.e., is the formality of good. 
Now, if value or inherent goodness consists in real fulfillment, then, if 
the fulfillment of X is an inherent good, then the being of X must also he an 
inherent good. That is, once we see that real fulfillment or perfection is the 
formality of good, then whatever the entities are in whom inherent value or 
good can inhere, they themselves, as well as their full flourishing, will be of 
inherent value. It seems incoherent to hold that the fulfillment of X is 
inherently valuable, but that X itself is not. 
Now dualism. The dualist claims that the subject of understanding is a 
non-bodily substance. This claim, however, seems inconsistent with the 
unity of self of which one is immediately aware. I am immediately aware 
that it is the same I that senses and understands.13 Now, sensation is a 
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bodily act. More specifically, sensation is a bodily affection, a bodily 
alteration brought about in me by the physical action of the thing on my 
sense organ. Since what a thing does and undergoes reveals what sort of 
thing it is, and since it is the same I that senses and understands, it follows 
that the I which understands is not simply a spiritual thing, not a 
consciousness using a body, but a bodily thing itself, an organism. 
To the objection that sensation may be a spiritual action performed by 
my consciousness , at the initiation of a bodily stimulus, a'la Descartes' 
analysis of sensation, one can reply that conscious sensation is different 
only in degree from quasi-conscious and unconscious (i.e. , non-reflexive) 
sensation. Unconscious sensation is certainly bodily in nature (and not just 
stimulated by a bodily change), and so, it seems most reasonable to hold , 
so is quasi-conscious and conscious sensation. The conclusion is that a 
human being is an organism, and is so essentially. Human beings are 
special types of organisms. 
Together, these points show that the gradualist position is incoherent. 
For since real fulfillment is the formality of good, then whatever the beings 
are which have inherent value, they themselves and not just their 
experiences have inherent value. It is incoherent to hold that the 
flourishing of X is inherently good, but not X itself. Thus, if we consider a 
healthy human adult, the paradigm case, as they say, of someone who has a 
right to life, then that human being himself or herself is inherently valuable 
and not just that person's experiences. But, secondly, as I also argued 
above, the human being is essentially an organism. Therefore, the time at 
which the human organism comes to be is the same time at which the 
human being comes to be. So, if X is a human being, then X came to be 
when the human organism which X is came to be. 
Add a Proposition 
Now let us add the following moral proposition, which is, at the very 
least, very plausible. If X is inherently valuable, and it is wrong directly to 
kill X at a certain time, then, other things being equal, it is also wrong 
directly to kill X at some previous time. So, to take myself as an example, if 
it is wrong directly to kill me today, then, other things being equal, it would 
have been wrong directly to kill me at any previous time. In particular, 
since I am an organism, and the organism comes to be at conception, the 
being that existed in my mother's womb 37 years ago is the same being that 
I am today. Therefore it would have been wrong directly to kill that being 
in my mother's womb 37 years ago.14 
Let us now return to the question regarding which similarities between 
different beings are morally relevant, and which are morally irrelevant for 
whether a being has moral standing. I have not yet provided a general 
criterion for distinguishing between those. Rather, I have argued that 
being the same thing at an earlier time must certainly be a morally relevant 
similarity. It would take a great deal more time to defend a general 
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criterion of moral standing, but I would like to set out, at least, what I 
think is the criterion, and try to explain it very briefly. 
Let me also add that my argument against the gradualist position does 
not logically depend on this part of the paper. For, regardless of what the 
correct moral tandard is, if the argument up to this point is correct, it 
establishes that human embryos or fetuses have the same basic rights as 
normal adult human beings. Nevertheless, psychologically, if one holds 
that sentience is the criterion of moral standing (and hence that all animals 
have moral standing) there is considerable pressure to admit degrees into 
moral standing, in the way Sumner does. 
Being a member of the human species is not the criterion of moral 
standing. Being a member of the human species is a sufficient condition, 
but it is not a necessary condition for having moral standing. If intelligent 
life from another planet landed on earth, we would owe it moral respect 
also. 
I would say that every rational agent, or every free agent, has moral 
standing. When one begins to deliberate about what one ought to do, one 
spontaneously recognizes that some objects are worth pursuing for their 
own sake, such objects as life, knowledge, friendship, and so on. These are 
the objects of our natural inclinations, the objects that are fulfilling or 
perfective, and recognized as intrinsically, not just instrumentally, good. 
Such objects or basic goods are not just goods for me, but for others as 
well. But the objects in question are objects of practical reason and choice, 
i.e., they are possibilities for a rational, free agent. This is not to say that 
they are good only when pursued by reason and choice, for my life is good 
even while I am sleeping and knowledge is good even when reached 
spontaneously and not by choice. But in these beginnings of practical or 
moral reasoning, I apprehend not that life in general is good, but that the 
sort oflife which can be an object of rational pursuit is an intrinsic goOd. 15 
Defending Criterion 
This criterion can be defended in the following way. Nonrational 
animals, inasmuch as the principle of their actions is exterior, are more 
similar to other sorts of beings, than they are to persons. Since they lack 
free choice, what actions they perform are completely determined by the 
kind of stimulus put before them, and so what goals their actions will be 
directed to are determined by others. In this sense they are like natural 
slaves: someone else, necessarily, selects their goals for them. They are, as it 
were, by nature instruments. Free agents, on the other hand, have the 
capacity to select their own goals , and so it makes sense to say that their 
concerns should be taken into account. 16 
When I say that it is the goods of free agents that generate moral 
responsibilities, what I mean is free agents as concrete things or 
substances. Moreover, the goods which I must pursue and respect are 
fundamentally aspects of what persons can be, i.e., they are various 
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potentialities or possibilities to which persons are naturally oriented. 
Therefore, whenever the thing, or substance, comes to be which has these 
basic potentialities, then it is that a being exists which demands moral 
respect. 
And so, by "free agent" I mean a thing which has the potentiality to 
pursue the various personal goods rationally or freely. Since human 
persons are organisms, they come to be at conception, and from that 
moment onward they have the active potentiality to realize all of the 
fulfillments of a human being, although it may take them some time to 
actualize those potentialities. The important point of morality is that life, 
knowledge, friendship, and so on, are possibilities or potentialities for this 
very being even though it may take this being even many years to actualize 
those potentialities. (It also is worth noting that they are even now actively 
developing themselves to the point at which they will realize these 
perfections. ) 
Finally, the argument is not that they potentially have those 
characteristics which confer personhood. To have such characteristics 
only potentially would mean that they have personhood only potentially. 
Nor is the point that they are potential persons and therefore have rights. 
Rather, being a thing which has the potentiality to rationally pursue these 
various goods is what confers actual personhood, and human embryos and 
fetuses have that characteristic actually not just potentially. 
Why, someone might object, should having the same potentiality as 
adult humans give embryos, fetuses and infants the same moral ~tatus as 
adults? Shouldn't what a thing does actually, count more than what it has 
the potentiality for? Why should we be concerned so much with 
potentiality? The answer - and I think it is a very important point for this 
whole controversy - is that our actions, our choices , primarily bear upon 
potentialities, on what can or could be. If I kill someone I do not, strictly 
speaking, take away from them their actuality. It is too late to deprive them 
of what they have been or what they are. My action, rather, deprives them 
of what they could have been, it brings it about that they will never 
actualize their possibilities. In other words, it is too late to deprive them of 
their past or present; if I kill them, what I deprive them of is their future. 
And so our actions and our choices bear primarily upon potentialities. 
Therefore, killing an unborn child is, in this respect, worse than killing an 
adult, because it robs from him or her more of his or her life. 
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